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It is widely recognized that technological change has the potential to reduce GHG emissions without 
compromising economic growth; hence, any better understanding of the process of technological 
innovation is likely to increase our knowledge of mitigation possibilities and costs. This paper 
explores how international knowledge flows affect the dynamics of the domestic R&D sector and the 
main economic and environmental variables. The analysis is performed using WITCH, a dynamic 
regional model of the world economy, in which energy technical change is endogenous. The focus is 
on disembodied energy R&D international spillovers. The knowledge pool from which regions draw 
foreign ideas differs between High Income and Low Income countries. Absorption capacity is also 
endogenous in the model. The basic questions are as follows. Do knowledge spillovers enhance energy 
technological innovation in different regions of the world? Does the speed of innovation increase? Or 
do free-riding incentives prevail and international spillovers crowd out domestic R&D efforts? What is 
the role of domestic absorption capacity and of policies designed to enhance it? Do greenhouse gas 
stabilization costs drop in the presence of international technological spillovers? The new specification 
of the WITCH model presented in this paper enables us to answer these questions. Our analysis shows 
that international knowledge spillovers tend to increase free-riding incentives and decrease the 
investments in energy R&D. The strongest cuts in energy R&D investments are recorded among High 
Income countries, where international knowledge flows crowd out domestic R&D efforts. The overall 
domestic pool of knowledge, and thus total net GHG stabilization costs, remain largely unaffected. 
International spillovers, however, are also an important policy channel. We therefore analyze the 
implication of a policy mix in which climate policy is combined with a technology policy designed to 
enhance absorption capacity in developing countries. Significant positive impacts on the costs of 
stabilising GHG concentrations are singled out. Finally, a sensitivity analysis shows that High Income 
countries are more responsive than Low Income countries to changes in the parameters and thus 
suggests to focus additional empirical research efforts on the former. 
JEL Code: H4, O3, Q4. 
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It is now widely recognized that technological change has the potential to reduce GHG 
emissions without generating negative feedbacks on economic growth. This is one of the 
reasons behind the many efforts recently devoted to the development of Integrated Economy-
Climate Models, in which technological change is endogenous and responds to market and 
policy incentives. Significant improvements in the estimate of optimal abatement paths and 
costs have thus been achieved. In particular, by disentangling the determinants of knowledge 
accumulation, and linking them to incentives arising from emission targets, it is now possible to 
measure how climate policy-induced technical change reduces the costs of atmospheric 
stabilization (Grubb, Carraro and Schellnhuber, 2006). However, despite this encouraging 
progress, the knowledge accumulation processes are still unclear, and the actual potential of 
technological innovation is far from being fully understood. 
 
For example, a few studies on the economics of atmospheric stabilization have addressed the 
role of international knowledge flows in the process of knowledge production and 
accumulation.
1 The transfer of knowledge across countries is instead crucial in shaping the 
diffusion of new technologies and in spreading basic scientific developments that gradually 
foster technological innovation in places different from where they were originally conceived. 
This is of central importance if we consider that new technologies are created and developed in 
a handful of countries, and that still greater concentration is recorded for the expenditure on 
energy R&D. However, despite its concentrated origin, knowledge clearly flows across 
countries: developing economies import goods and services that embody the technological 
progress made in the laboratories of richer countries, and are increasingly exposed to the flow of 
knowledge that circulates among world research laboratories, the so-called disembodied 
knowledge flows. There is also a rich exchange of knowledge among industrialized countries, 
that often participate in joint research agreements to share the costs and risks of the most 
expensive projects.
2 It is therefore crucial to understand how knowledge flows across countries 
                                                 
1 In Buonanno, Carraro e Galeotti (2003) the world stock of knowledge affects productivity of the energy 
input and reduces the emission output ratio. Gerlagh and Kuik (2003) use a static general equilibrium 
model to analyze the effect of endogenous technical change and international technology diffusion on 
carbon leakage. Kemfert (2005) contains some attempts to account for international technology spillovers 
across countries via capital flows in a general equilibrium model. Some improvements are contained in 
Gerlagh (2006), again within a CGE framework. 
2 A good example is ITER, a joint international research and development project that aims to 
demonstrate the scientific and technical feasibility of fusion power. The partners in the project are the 
European Union, Japan, the People´s Republic of China, India, the Republic of Korea, the Russian 
Federation and the USA. 
  2in order to correctly assess by how much and at what cost technological change can increase 
energy efficiency and lower carbon intensity worldwide. 
 
The idea of reducing atmospheric stabilization costs by filling the knowledge gap between 
countries with more technological cooperation is very attractive indeed, and has been 
emphasized by several authors (e.g. Barrett, 1994, 2002; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1994; Grubb, 
Hope and Fouquet, 2002; Philibert, 2004; Buchner et al, 2005). On these grounds, any policy 
aimed at increasing the circulation of world knowledge should be promoted. For example, favor 
treatment could be dispensed to knowledge flows, disclosure of sensitive information could be 
encouraged and joint development programs could be financed to increase knowledge sharing 
and the productivity of R&D efforts. These proposals have also captivated the interest of policy 
makers: the basic idea of knowledge transfers is at the core of the recent Asia-Pacific agreement 
on climate change control. 
 
However, the enhanced circulation of ideas and the free dissemination of technological 
innovation throughout the world does not necessarily imply that total global innovation will 
increase and abatement costs decrease. Several obstacles have been identified (Cf. Carraro, 
2001 for a survey). For example, a given country may not have the capacity to absorb the flow 
of ideas and research results coming from other countries. Knowledge from international 
spillovers may crowd out domestic R&D efforts. Free-riding incentives may induce some 
countries to reduce their own expenditures in Research and Development. The basic questions 
are therefore as follows. Do knowledge spillovers enhance energy technological innovation in 
different regions of the world? Do spillovers increase R&D expenditures? Or do free-riding 
incentives prevail and international spillovers crowd out domestic R&D efforts? What is the 
role of domestic absorption capacity and of policies designed to enhance it? And finally, do 
greenhouse gas stabilization costs drop in the presence of international technological spillovers? 
The new model specification presented in this paper enables us to answer these questions. 
 
We address both researchers and policy makers by discussing modelling issues and analysing 
possible cost reductions achievable by greater knowledge diffusion. Our exploration of the role 
of international knowledge spillovers will be based on a new version of WITCH, a dynamic 
regional model of the world economy, in which energy technical change is endogenous and 
free-riding incentives from R&D spillovers and other sources are also accounted for. Although 
embodied technology transfers play an important role in spreading technical know-how across 
the world, we focus our analysis on disembodied knowledge spillovers, i.e. on the positive 




In this paper, we disentangle three main issues that a modeler faces when dealing with 
international knowledge spillovers: first, the size and the characteristics of the international 
knowledge pool from which each country picks ideas to implement at home has to be defined. 
From another perspective, are knowledge stocks cumulated in different countries heterogeneous 
or homogeneous, and if they are a mix, to what degree do they overlap? Second, the process of 
knowledge absorption: are spillovers a "manna from heaven" that indiscriminately falls in each 
country, regardless of its degree of technological development, or is some domestic effort 
necessary to absorb foreign knowledge? Third, how do spillovers interact with the domestic 
knowledge production sector? Do patents, blueprints produced abroad substitute those 
discovered at home? 
 
Unfortunately, the limited empirical work on energy efficiency R&D spillovers does not 
provide us with clear indications on the most appropriate model specification.
4 We therefore 
make and compare some reasonable assumptions on absorption capacity, on the available 
international knowledge pool, and on the interactions between international spillovers and the 
domestic R&D sector. These assumptions are then integrated into the equations of the WITCH 
model. This is then used to analyze how costs and benefits of GHG stabilisation policy are 
affected by the presence of international R&D spillovers, to define the impact of international  
spillovers on domestic R&D efforts, and to determine what policy can be designed to enhance 
the dissemination of energy-saving technologies. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly introduces the WITCH model 
and discusses our modeling of R&D spillovers. Section 3 presents the calibration results, a new 
baseline, and analyses the dynamics of stabilization investments in R&D when international 
spillovers are explicitly modeled. In this section, we also present our new results on the costs 
and benefits of GHG stabilization policy. Section 4 discusses a policy mix in which climate 
policy is combined with an R&D incentive scheme designed to enhance the absorption capacity 
in developing countries, and thus the dissemination of new energy technologies. Section 5 
shows the main outputs of our sensitivity analysis. A concluding section summarizes our results. 
                                                 
3 For the role of trade in spreading technological knowledge see Keller (1997), Coe and Helpman (1995), 
Eaton and Kortum (1996). 
4 See Lanjouw and Mody (1996) for an analysis of innovation and international diffusion of 
environmental responsive technology. 
  42. The WITCH model 
2.1 Short model description 
WITCH – World Induced Technical Change Hybrid – is a regional integrated assessment model 
structured to provide normative information on the optimal responses of world economies to 
climate damages. It is a hybrid model because it combines features of both top-down and 
bottom-up modeling: the top-down component consists of an inter-temporal optimal growth 
model in which the energy input of the aggregate production function has been integrated into a 
bottom-up like description of the energy sector. World countries are grouped in 12 regions that 
strategically interact when determining their optimal policies. A game theoretic framework is 
adopted to capture these strategic interactions. A climate module and a damage function provide 
the feedback on the economy of carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere. 
 
WITCH top-down framework guarantees a coherent, fully intertemporal allocation of 
investments that have an impact on the level of mitigation – R&D effort, investments in energy 
technologies, fossil fuel expenditures. The regional specification of the model and the presence 
of interdependencies among regions – through CO2, exhaustible natural resources, trade and 
technological spillovers – allows us to account for the incentives to free-ride. By solving an 
open-loop Nash game, the investment strategies are optimized taking into account both 
economic and environmental externalities.  
 
WITCH contains a detailed representation of the energy sector, which allows the model to 
produce a reasonable characterization of future energy and technological scenarios and an 
assessment of their compatibility with the goal of stabilizing greenhouse gases concentrations. 
In addition, by endogenously modeling fuel (oil, coal, natural gas, uranium) prices, as well as 
the cost of storing the CO2 captured, the model can be used to evaluate the implication of 
mitigation policies on the energy system in all its components. In the next subsections, we focus 
on the representation of technical change; for a thorough description of the model, see Bosetti et 
al. (2006) and Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni (2007). 
 
2.2 Endogenous Technical Change (ETC) in the WITCH model 
Energy-related technical change is endogenous in WITCH. Thanks to the hybrid nature of the 
model, we portray endogenous technological change both in its bottom-up and top-down 
dimensions: R&D investments designed to enhance energy-efficiency increase the productivity 
  5of energy inputs in generating energy services; growing expertise driven by Learning-by-Doing 
(LbD) reduces the cost of power generation plants. 
 
Following Popp (2004), in country n at time t, technological advances are captured by a stock of 
knowledge,  HE(n,t), combined with energy, EN(n,t), in a constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) function that simulates the production of energy services, ES(n,t), demanded by the final 
good production sector: 
() [
ρ ρ ρ α α
/ 1
) , ( ) , ( , t n EN t n HE t n ES EN H + = ] . (1) 
The R&D sector exhibits intertemporal spillovers and the production of new "ideas" follows an 
innovation possibility frontier (Kennedy, 1964): knowledge is produced "standing on the 
shoulders" of the nation's giants: investment in R&D is combined with the stock of ideas 
already discovered and produces new knowledge which will be the base for new discoveries in 
the following years. A similar description of the R&D sector can be found in the seminal paper 
by Romer (1990), in which the research sector productivity increases proportionally with the 
stock of knowledge cumulated in the past, giving rise to endogenous growth. Using data on 
patent citations, Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993), Trajtenberg, Henderson and Jaffe 
(1992) and Caballero and Jaffe (1993), have found evidence of state dependence at the industry 
level.
5 In the specific narrower scope of our analysis, Popp (2002) finds that the energy R&D 
sector exhibits diminishing returns. Denoting R&D Investments with I, the production of new 
ideas in country n at time t, Z, is modelled as follows: 
()
c b t n HE t n  aI   t n Z ) , ( ) , ( , = , (2) 
where   so as to account for diminishing returns. Assuming that obsolescence makes a 
fraction 
1 < +c b
δ  of past ideas not fruitful for the purpose of current innovation activity, the law of 
motion of the R&D stock is as follows: 
( ) t n Z t n  HE )  t HE(n , ) 1 )( , ( 1 , + − = + δ . (3) 
Since in the present specification of the model we do not explicitly model non-energy R&D, we 
assume an exogenous crowding out effect between energy and non-energy R&D.
6 Empirical 
                                                 
5 According to Rosenberg (1994), not only does technological progress in one nation shows state 
dependence, but also path dependence. This interpretation of technological progress will be used in the 
next section to justify one of our modelling formulations. 
6 For a study on R&D crowding out in the short and medium term see Goolsbee (1998). 
  6studies have shown that the returns to higher investments in R&D are four times higher than 
those for general investment, thus the total cost of energy R&D investments is as in equation 
(4): 
) ( 4 ) , ( ) , ( & nt I t n I n t COST D R ψ + = . (4) 
Where ψ  is the crowding out parameter which measures how many dollars of generic R&D 
investment are lost per each dollar of energy R&D investment. We set  5 . 0 = ψ  as in Popp 
(2004). 
 
2.3. International R&D Spillovers 
Researchers do not only stand on the shoulders of their predecessors but also on those of their 
neighbours.
7 Knowledge flows across countries, either embodied in traded goods or 
disembodied, in blueprints, patents, exchange of ideas between researchers, and imitation. We 
concentrate here on disembodied knowledge spillovers. Being WITCH a multiregional model, 
we can accommodate for the effect of disembodied knowledge spillovers by introducing a 
transmission channel across energy R&D sectors in each region. Thus, the implications of these 
spillovers for investments in the creation of new ideas, climate policy costs and energy demand 
can all be analysed. 
 
Unfortunately, the empirical analysis of international spillovers induced by energy-saving R&D 
investments is almost nonexistent and it is thus not possible to derive useful modeling insights 
from the available empirical research. After comparing several alternative specifications of the 
equations representing technology spillovers in the model, here is the one that we propose as the 
most reliable. Countries/regions are exposed to a pool of world knowledge that can be 
considered as a global public good. A fraction of this knowledge is absorbed by each country 
and is available for use in the domestic R&D sector. Different assumptions can be made on (1) 
the characteristics of world knowledge, on (2) the process of absorption and on (3) the way in 
which countries use this available information. We follow this three-step approach to highlight 
the most relevant issues and to illustrate our modelling choices. 
 
                                                 
7 See Chapter 11 in Rosenberg (1982). 
  72.4  International Knowledge Pool 
We consider two distinct views of the pool of international knowledge. In the first, 
technological development is seen as a process in which all countries move upwards on the 
same knowledge ladder, with the least technologically advanced lying at the bottom and the 
technological innovator at the top; each region has a distinct position along the ladder at any 
time. Only knowledge still not possessed (in its possess) is attractive. Innovators receive scarce 
or no benefit from exposure to international knowledge while laggards harvest substantial gains. 
This was the view of technological progress put forward by Gerschenkron (1962) in his famous 
essay  Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: by adopting frontier technologies, 
backward countries could catch up with advanced economies at a relatively fast pace. More 
recently, the idea of knowledge that trickles down from the technological frontier to the 
technological laggards was explored by Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006). 
 
In our second description of world knowledge, we assume that countries move, at least partially, 
along independent technological patterns, and thus all external knowledge adds new insights to 
the domestic knowledge capital. Rosenberg (1994), in his second exploration of technological 
development, argues that indeed the technological development of countries tends to follow 
specific patterns influenced by the sequence of particular events which constitutes the history of 
the system. According to this view, the very same history of countries, their different regulatory 
regimes, and their economic and social environments, are drivers of technological 
differentiation. Indeed, for energy technologies we record a similar pattern of R&D and 
technology discoveries, and a clear example of path-dependent technological progress is the 
success of the wind industry in Europe. When technologies tend to diverge, spillovers are a 
great source of benefit because they fill in important gaps that might otherwise remain 
unexplored. 
 
According to the first view, the knowledge pool accessible to each region is provided by the 
technology that lies unexplored between its own and the innovator’s knowledge stock, whereas 
according to the second view, the knowledge pool equals the overall amount of world 
knowledge detained by other countries. Both these two representations of the pool of ideas 
available to each country capture some interesting and important features of the process of 
technology diffusion. In our analysis, we assume that the first view prevails in Low Income 
countries. Therefore, for Low Income countries, the absorption of knowledge from the 
innovator is the prevailing effect to model, i.e. the Gerschenkron effect. The second view, i.e. 
  8the situation described by Rosenberg with heterogeneous capital stocks, is to be preferred for 
High Income countries.  
 
We combine these two different representations in one single formulation by assuming that the 
technological frontier is set not only by a single innovator but by the whole group of High 
Income countries, i.e. that the technological frontier is measured by the sum of the stocks of 
R&D capital detained by these countries. High Income countries may draw from the knowledge 
stock of all other High Income countries, while the Low Income countries’ knowledge pool 
consists of the knowledge accumulated in the more advanced economies (those setting the 
world’s  technological frontier). For Low Income countries, we describe the process of 
technological advancement as an upward movement along a technology ladder; the gap to fill is 
measured by the difference between each country’s R&D capital stock and the technological 
frontier capital. At high levels of technological development, however, countries specialize in 
different energy R&D paths and thus they have the opportunity to benefit from all other High 
Income countries’ R&D stocks, which constitute the knowledge pool. By assuming a 
technological frontier determined by more than one country, we avoid the case of one single 
world leader, which cannot absorb any valuable knowledge from its followers, which is highly 
unrealistic when not dealing with a specific industry. If we define HI as the set of High Income 
Countries, equation (5) describes the knowledge pool for all n countries: 
() ( ) ( ) t n HE t n HE t n KP
HI n , , , − =∑ ∈  ,  (5) 
where HE is the regional stock of knowledge as defined in equation (3). 
 
2.5 Knowledge Absorption 
Moving to the second logical step, we assume that only a fraction  ) , ( t n γ  of the world’s 
available pool of knowledge is absorbed by each country. The absorption parameter γ might be 
an indicator of industrial policy or of the legal environment, or a measure of some effort to 
absorb international knowledge. We consider γ as being primarily a function of domestic 
knowledge. In this we follow Cohen and Levinthal (1989), who were the first to suggest that the 
process of learning, far from being free, is costly and that most of this cost is borne by a stock of 
knowledge cumulated in the receiving country. Keller (2004) reinforces this position in his 
survey of international knowledge spillovers by showing that an R&D effort is needed to absorb 
international knowledge. By means of an empirical analysis of spillovers across OECD 
manufacturing industries, Kneller (2005) finds that absorptive capacity, rather than physical 
  9distance, plays an important role in determining the amount of knowledge transfers at the 
international level. Also Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen (2003) find that R&D increases the 
absorption of knowledge spillovers and that neglecting this "second face" of knowledge 
investments necessarily leads to an underestimation of R&D's social rate of return. Accordingly, 
we assume that the absorption capacity  ) , ( t n γ  is a function of the distance of R&D capital 
accumulated in the region with respect to the technological frontier. We use the ratio of one 










) , ( γ . (6) 
The further one country lies from the technological frontier, the lesser this country is able to 
absorb knowledge from the potentially available international knowledge pool. In words, the 
lack of laboratories, scientific bodies, investments in R&D in Low Income countries is a serious 
obstacle to the profitable use of the knowledge that circulates in the world. The low absorptive 
capacity of Low Income countries realistically reduces the potentially very large inflow of 
knowledge from the technological frontier in determining the overall amount of knowledge 
spillovers. More in general, also High Income Countries may see their absorptive capacity 
decline over time if they do not innovate at the same pace of their advanced partners. This is 
indeed true for all technological breakthroughs that completely change the paradigms in a 
discipline: even if close to the frontier, countries lagging behind might fail to reap any benefit 
from these new discoveries. 
 
Accordingly, the spillover of international knowledge in region n at time t,  , is 
obtained by multiplying the Knowledge Pool and the absorption capacity: 
( t n SPILL , )
( ) ( )
()
()
() () [ t n HE t n HE
t j HE
t n HE














Notice that spillovers are a bell-shaped function of the country’s R&D capital stock. For Low 
Income countries, the peak of the curve lies halfway from the technological frontier. Spillovers 
are thus first increasing and then decreasing along the transition from low to high level of 
technological progress. For High Income countries, spillovers are increasing until the capital 
  10stock of one country is equal to the sum of the capital stocks of all the other High Income 
countries. 
 
2.6 Spillover Use 
The third and final step consists in defining how countries use the spillover in their process of 
knowledge generation. We assume that spillovers enter the domestic R&D sector as an input in 
the innovation possibility frontier. Thanks to this highly standardized aggregation of different 
production inputs we can control for the elasticity of the production of new ideas to 
international R&D spillover, i.e. the coefficient d in equation (8) below:
8
() ( ) ( )
d c b
D R t n SPILL t n HE t n I n  a   t n Z , ) , ( ) , ( , & = . (8) 
 
2.7 Synthesis 
In the previous sub-sections, we described the logical steps that have been followed to introduce 
international energy R&D spillovers in the WITCH model. There is a variety of other available 
options that were considered and explored. However, the one chosen is the strongest from a 
theoretical point of view, and it has the advantage of being tractable and easily understandable, 
while capturing the most interesting effects at work. 
 
Notice that in our framework the public good features of the knowledge pool are somehow 
mitigated. Were knowledge a fully global public good, the incentive to free-riding would 
dominate, regions would invest less in technology R&D and the overall production of 
knowledge would shrink.
9 On the contrary, by giving knowledge a role in the process of 
knowledge absorption and by letting international R&D spillover augment the productivity of 
domestic investment, we have introduced forces that work against the free-riding incentive. This 
is in accordance with the literature on knowledge spillovers. As an example, Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989) have shown that when domestic R&D increases absorption capacity and some 
general conditions hold, the incentive to invest more in R&D offsets the disincentive 
represented by free-riding, and world investments in R&D eventually increase. 
 
                                                 
8 For an analogous aggregation of spillovers to domestic investment and capital stock see Acemoglu 
(2002), p. 793. 
9 The standard result that sees free-riding effects to dominate has also been questioned by D’Aspremont 
and Jacquemin (1988), who show how, in a cooperative setting with strong knowledge flows, spillovers 
induce higher overall investment in R&D due to the full internalization of positive externalities. 
  113. Calibration, New Baseline and the Effects of Spillovers on GHG Stabilization 
Summing up, the new equation that describes the process of technology creation in country n at 
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We set the parameter d to be equal to 0.15, i.e. an increase of 1% of international spillovers 
increases the output of domestic ideas by 0.15%. Since, to our knowledge, there is no empirical 
evidence that attributes the value of the elasticity of knowledge generation to international 
spillovers, we have chosen here a value slightly lower than the elasticity of knowledge 
production to domestic investments (equal to 0.18), and about one third of the elasticity with 
respect to past capital stock, which is equal to 0.53 in the model without spillovers. Thus, we 
give priority to domestic investments in generating new discoveries, and we assume that 
intertemporal knowledge spillovers are stronger than the international ones. The effects and the 
robustness of this choice will be tested through an appropriate sensitivity analysis (see Section 
5). 
 
We calibrated the new production function so as to reproduce the same time path of the R&D 
capital stock without international spillovers; this also yields exactly equal paths for output and 
all energy variables and a very similar time path for R&D investments. Calibration was 
performed by reducing c in equation (9) so as to accommodate for the new input. By explicitly 
modelling international spillovers, we can separate the two "standing on shoulders" effects and 
attribute a correct nationality to the "giants" on which present researchers stand. Decreasing 
returns to scale are preserved. New values for parameter c are country- and time-specific. 
 
We tested the above modeling choices by computing the costs and benefits of a 450 stabilization 
policy, i.e. a policy aimed at stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 450ppmv (550ppmv 
when considering all gases) at the end of the 21
st century. We computed the effects of this 
stabilization policy both with and without international energy R&D spillovers. 
 
In the WITCH model, the group of High Income countries is composed by USA, OLDEURO, 
NEWEURO, KOSAU (Korea, South Africa and Australia), CAJANZ (Canada, Japan, New 
  12Zeland), while all other regions are labeled as Low Income.
10 A world ceiling on emissions 
across the century is derived consistently from the stabilization target and emission allowances 
are distributed across world regions according to the Sovereignty rule, i.e. each year regions 
receive a fraction of permits equal to their share of world emissions in the base year 2002. This 
distribution scheme is, of course, highly questionable, but it offers the grounds for studying 
policies to redistribute the effort of stabilization from Low Income to High Income countries. 
The latter may design policies to compensate Low Income countries for any distribution of 
permits that is considered inequitable, as will be shown in Section 4. A world carbon market 
equalizes marginal abatement costs worldwide.
11
 
Table 1 shows a first important result: although our modeling choices rule out strong free-riding 
effects, world investments in R&D are always lower when spillovers are accounted for. The gap 
is about 3.5% in the first decades of the century and then progressively declines to 1.5% at the 
end of the century. Greater discrepancies are recorded if we look at more disaggregated data. 
High Income countries reduce investments the most, by cutting 4.1% of their R&D effort at the 
beginning of the century. This figure then decreases gradually to 1.5% at the end of the 
simulation period. For Low Income countries we record only a mild 1.7% reduction in the first 
decades, then a slightly greater gap at the middle of the century when they cut their efforts by 
2.1%, and finally a decline to a 1.6% reduction at the end of the century. The difference in  
behaviour between High and Low Income countries during the first decades of the century is 
explained by the fact that, for Low Income countries, spillovers increase at a faster rate as they 
augment their capital stocks and move along the bell-shaped curve that governs knowledge 
inflows, as explained in the previous section. 
 
It is also worth noting that among High Income countries the greatest reductions are recorded in 
USA, OLDEUROPE and CAJANZ, with the greatest difference found in USA, the smallest for 
CAJANZ, and OLDEUROPE in the middle. Investments decrease less in KOSAU and 
NEWEUROPE, the other two High Income countries, than in the top three countries/regions 
and for both, the share of investments at the frontier, i.e. the share of all High Income countries’ 
investments, increases by 4% and 2.2%, respectively, in the first decades of the century. Thus, 
                                                 
10 The aggregation of countries into twelve world regions is described in Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni 
(2006). 
11 A distribution of emission allowances according to the "Equal per Capita" rule has also been tested. 
There are only very minor differences in R&D investments and all the results illustrated in this section are 
confirmed. The reason is that the carbon price is independent of the distribution of permits, as expected 
from the theoretical prediction of the Coase theorem, and income effects have only mild impacts on 
investment choices. 
  13our results show that spillovers enhance convergence among countries at the frontier, as detailed 
in Table 2. 
 
2022 2042 2062 2082 2102
USA -5.2% -4.2% -3.3% -2.6% -1.8%
OLDEURO -3.8% -3.2% -2.6% -2.1% -1.4%
NEWEURO -0.3% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.4%
KOSAU -2.0% -1.9% -1.7% -1.4% -1.0%
CAJAZ -3.3% -2.8% -2.2% -1.8% -1.2%
TE -1.0% -1.3% -1.3% -1.2% -0.9%
MENA -2.2% -2.5% -2.5% -2.4% -2.0%
SSA 0.6% -0.3% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4%
SASIA -1.2% -1.7% -1.8% -1.7% -1.3%
CHINA -1.8% -2.4% -2.4% -2.2% -1.7%
EASIA -1.4% -1.9% -2.0% -1.9% -1.5%
LACA -2.0% -2.2% -2.1% -1.9% -1.4%
WORLD -3.5% -2.9% -2.5% -2.0% -1.5%
HIGH INCOME -4.1% -3.4% -2.7% -2.1% -1.5%
LOW INCOME -1.7% -2.1% -2.1% -2.0% -1.6%
Table 1. 
Reduction of R&D Investments when Spillovers are Modeled.
 
 
2022 2042 2062 2082 2102
USA -1.2% -0.9% -0.7% -0.5% -0.3%
OLDEURO 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
NEWEURO 4.0% 3.0% 2.2% 1.6% 1.1%
KOSAU 2.2% 1.5% 1.0% 0.7% 0.4%
CAJAZ 0.8% 0.6% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2%
Table 2. 
Variation of Share of High Income Countries Investments.  
 
 
Among Low Income countries, we record reductions in investments for all countries except for 
SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa) that slightly increases its investments when spillovers are introduced. 
However, as shown in Table 3, during the first decades of the century, reductions are inferior to 
those recorded for High Income countries and thus their share of world R&D between 2002 and 
2032 increases, ranging from 4.3% for SSA to 1.3% for MENA (Middle East and North Africa). 
As a group, Low Income countries increase their share of world investments between 2002 and 
2082 and slightly invert the trend at the end of the century. 
 
Summing up, our results show some convergence in R&D investments shares among High 
Income countries. As a group, these countries lose grounds in favour of Low Income countries 
  14in the first decades of the century. Hence, our formulation of international R&D Spillovers 
captures the convergence process from multiple perspectives. It must also be stressed that these 
results are obtained within a stabilization scenario in which, even without spillovers, there is a 
high degree of convergence in R&D investments and capital stocks across world regions. 
International spillovers thus reinforce an already strong underlying convergence process.
12
 
Changes in the stock of R&D are instead negligible. International knowledge inflows substitute  
domestic investments and the cuts are spread across the economy. In addition, energy R&D 
expenditures at the end of the century, when they are at their highest level, range from 0.12% to 
0.02% of GDP, respectively, for USA and SSA. Therefore, the change induced by spillovers is 
small in absolute terms. As a consequence, gains in terms of stabilization costs are also 
negligible. As an example, over the whole century, the USA save 72 USD Billions over a 
cumulated GDP of more than 2100 Trillions in our stabilization scenario, i.e. a modest 0.003%. 
 
Given that the stock of domestic R&D changes only slightly, and that we do not record any 
significant effect of spillovers on the available income, there is also no adjustment in the 
investment in all energy technologies, and the price of emissions permits does not vary when 
spillovers are introduced. 
 
2022 2042 2062 2082 2102
USA -1.8% -1.3% -0.9% -0.6% -0.3%
OLDEURO -0.3% -0.3% -0.1% 0.0% 0.1%
NEWEURO 3.4% 2.6% 2.0% 1.6% 1.1%
KOSAU 1.6% 1.1% 0.8% 0.6% 0.5%
CAJANZ 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3%
TE 2.6% 1.7% 1.1% 0.8% 0.6%
MENA 1.3% 0.4% -0.1% -0.3% -0.5%
SSA 4.3% 2.8% 2.1% 1.7% 1.2%
SASIA 2.4% 1.3% 0.6% 0.3% 0.2%
CHINA 1.7% 0.6% 0.1% -0.1% -0.2%
EASIA 2.2% 1.1% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0%
LACA 1.6% 0.8% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1%
HI -0.6% -0.4% -0.2% -0.1% 0.0%
LI 1.9% 0.9% 0.3% 0.1% -0.1%
Table 3. 
Variation of Share of World Investments in Energy R&D.
 
                                                 
12 In order to control for differences between the two stabilization scenarios that might arise from small 
discrepancies between the baselines with and without spillovers, we have also compared the changes in 
investments in R&D induced by the stabilization policy with and without spillovers and we are able to 
confirm the results illustrated in the text.
  154. GHG Stabilisation and Technology Diffusion. A Policy Exercise 
Even though spillovers have a major impact on the amount and distribution of R&D 
investments, but only a minor impact on energy investments and overall stabilization costs, they 
may play an important role to shape investment and emission strategies. Assume indeed that a 
set of countries decide to adopt an energy R&D policy to stimulate the development of a new 
low-carbon energy technology. The overall effects of this policy can be properly assessed only 
in a model with international spillovers, where the benefits of R&D investments are not limited 
to the country where investments are made. As another example, consider a policy aimed at 
increasing the circulation of world knowledge, indistinctly among regions or with a special 
focus on some areas. This kind of policy intervention is frequently debated (Cf. Barrett, 2001) 
and could be the core of a future GHG stabilization treaty (this is recommended, for example, in 
the June 2007 Heiligendamm Summit Declaration). Again, the overall effects of such policy can 
only be studied in models in which knowledge flows are explicitly modeled. 
 
Let us analyse, in this paper, a third case, in which a 450 ppm stabilization policy, based on the 
introduction of a global permit market, is coupled to a policy to foster knowledge dissemination. 
Let us assume that emission permits are distributed according to the Sovereignty rule as in the 
previous stabilization exercise. With such a distribution of emission permits – rather extreme 
but often debated in the policy arena – complementary policies to alleviate the burden falling on 
Low Income countries would be needed to redistribute the cost of stabilizing GHG 
concentrations. R&D cooperation policies are certainly among the most promising tools to 
attain this objective. 
 
We consider here an R&D cooperation policy in which High Income countries use a fraction of 
the revenues from emission permit sales to build absorption capacity in Low Income countries. 
This is shown in equation (10), which modifies equation (9): 
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where  is the Low Income countries absorption capacity stock, which derives from the 
flow of R&D cooperation aid,  , coming from High Income countries.   evolves 
as shown in equation (11): 
( t n ABS , )
) () t AID ( t n ABS ,
  16( ) ( ) t AID t n ABS t n ABS + − = + δ 1 ) , ( ) 1 , (  (11) 
The fraction of revenues from emission permits sales devoted to fund R&D technology transfers 
and cooperation declines across time as shown in Table 4. The world fund devoted to increase 
bsorption capacity in Low Income countries ranges between 2 and 105 billion USD. These 
revenues are equally shared among Low Income countries. 
 
a
2007 2022 2042 2062 2082 2102
Share of Carbon Permits 
Sales
7 8 % 3 7 % 1 4 % 5 %2 %1 %
Billions per year
(1995 USD)
2 35 87 105 70 37
Table 4.
Financial Aid for R&D Absorption Capacity.  
 
Table 5 shows the impact of this stabilization and R&D cooperation policy-mix on GHG 
stabilization costs. R&D cooperation policy reduces stabilization costs in Low Income countries 
by 2.2% with respect to the standard stabilization policy examined in Section 3. High Income 
stabilization costs increase by 11.3% (but their quota of world stabilization costs remains fairly 
w because of the application of the sovereignty principle in allocating permits). Overall, we 
is case, there are gains both for Low 
come countries and for the World as a whole. However, these gains are smaller than when the 
and more based on external 
                                                
lo
record a reduction of world GHG stabilization costs.
13
 
In order to test the validity of our exercise we also simulated a redistribution policy in which 
High Income countries transfer to Low Income ones the same amount of resources that they 
spend for building the extra absorption capacity. In th
In
policy is targeted to enhance R&D absorption capacity. 
 
Table 6 shows that by intervening on the absorption capacity the knowledge stock available to 
Low Income countries increases by more than 50% by the end of the century. Instead 
investments, as also shown in Table 6, only marginally increase. The reason is that, as time goes 
by, new ideas developed in Low Income countries are more 
 
13 The variation is very high for OLDEUROPE because the initially very low level of costs magnifies, in 
percentage terms, the change due to the introduction of an international transfer scheme for building 
absorption capacity in Low Income countries. 
  17knowledge than on domestic effort. The economic gains are induced by this increased free flow 















HIGH INCOME 11.33% 10.63%
LOW INCOME -2.30% -1.55%
450 + R&D 
Absorption
450 + Transfer




450 + R&D 
Absorption
450 + Transfer
USA 0% 0% -1% 0%
OLDEURO 0% 0% -1% 0%
NEWEURO 0% 0% -1% 0%
KOSAU 0% 0% -1% 0%
CAJAZ 0% 0% -1% 0%
TE 56% 0% 6% 0%
MENA 46% 0% 3% 0%
SSA 93% 0% 13% 0%
SASIA 53% 0% 4% 0%
CHINA 46% 0% 3% 0%
EASIA 53% 0% 4% 0%
LACA 47% 0% 3% 0%
WORLD 25% 0% 1% 0%
HIGH INCOME 0% 0% -1% 0%
LOW INCOME 52% 0% 4% 0%
R&D Capital at 2102
R&D Investments
(Cumulative, 2002-2102)
450 + R&D 
Absorption
Table 6.
Change of R&D Capital and R&D Investments
when Absorption Capacity Building Policy is Implemented.
 
 
  18The above analysis of the combined stabilization and R&D policy should be considered as a 
realistic proxy of any policy under which the distribution of emission permits, or the abatement 
effort, favours High Income countries and a set of re-distribution measures is therefore 
necessary. Our analysis clearly shows that absorption capacity is a powerful channel through 
in LI countries can be enhanced, and through this channel it is possible 
to increase equity and achieve higher efficiency. 
 
arameter  d. With the lower bound, instead, we allow for a sufficiently low relevance of 
for all values of the parameter d that were considered, 
vestments in energy R&D in a 450ppmv stabilization scenario decline in almost all countries 
e countries progresses over time, reaches its maximum before the end of the 
entury, and then regresses to converge towards values similar to those found for High Income 
its of the internationally available pool of technologies due to 
which the capital stocks 
 
5. Sensitivity Analysis. 
As previously discussed, there is some uncertainty over the value to assign to the elasticity of 
knowledge creation to international R&D spillovers. Therefore, we tested the robustness of our 
findings to different values of this elasticity. We used a symmetric interval around the central 
value of 0.15 by setting 0.20 and 0.10 as upper and lower bounds, respectively. With the upper 
bound value, the elasticity of knowledge creation to international spillovers is greater than that 
of domestic investments, whose value is 0.18. 0.20 is thus a considerably high level for the
p
international R&D spillovers by assuming that a one percent increase of foreign knowledge is 
almost half as powerful as a one percent increase in domestic investment in creating new ideas. 
 
Sensitivity analysis shows that 
in
when spillovers are explicitly modeled (the only exception is SSA). This confirms the results 
described in the previous section. 
 
Figures 1 to 4 show, for different years, the relationship found between the parameter d and the 
magnitude of cuts in energy R&D investments, with respect to the stabilization scenario without 
spillovers. The strongest responses are recorded from High Income countries, but the sensitivity 
of Low Incom
c
countries. For these countries we find instead a constantly declining responsiveness to spillovers 
across time.  
 
This implies that our model yields different reactions to spillovers as a function of the degree of 
economic development (the level of knowledge accumulation). Initially, Low Income countries 
find it difficult to reap the benef
  19their low absorption capacity; however, as their cumulated stock of knowledge increases, they 
s 
ome meaningful implications: empirical research should above all be addressed to estimate the 
impact of energy R&D spillovers in High Income countries and the lack of reliable data on Low 
Income countries should not be considered as a serious obstacle to perform model simulations. 
 
substitute more and more easily foreign to domestic investments and become more reactive to 
the foreign flows of knowledge. 
 
Consider now the responsiveness of domestic investments to international spillovers in the first 
half of the century. In case of "standing-on-shoulders" effects, as in WITCH, investments in the 
next decades will be crucial to determine future knowledge stocks and energy intensities in the 
subsequent decades. It is thus important to understand the effect of knowledge spillovers on 
these early investments. We have seen that while Low Income countries investments’ decisions 
are relatively rigid with respect to the degree of international spillovers, High Income countries 
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The shadowed areas in Figures 5 and 6 show the range of reductions in R&D investments for 
USA and CHINA, with respect to the stabilization scenario without spillovers. The area 
included between the two extreme parameter values of 0.10 and 0.20 has been shadowed to 
highlight the range of values found; the dotted lines correspond to intermediate values assigned 
to the parameter d and the solid line corresponds to the central value 0.15. As noted above, the 
widest range is recorded for the country with the highest level of capital per capita.
14 CHINA 
starts from low ranges, but as income per capita and knowledge increase, and spillovers become 
more important, the range increases as well. This is due to the bell-shaped curve that governs 
spillovers, as explained in Section 2. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In order to achieve the emission reductions needed for stabilizing concentrations of GHG in the 
atmosphere at safe levels, new technologies must be developed to soften the link between 
economic/demographic growth and carbon emissions. The development of technologies that 
allow for a more efficient use of energy is part of this effort and will certainly play a substantial 
role in any future stabilization policy. New technologies like hybrid engines, for example, allow 
for a substantial reduction of energy consumption, while delivering the same services. More 
efficient air conditioning systems would cut energy consumption in a significant manner, while 
preserving unaltered comfort conditions. 
 
The discovery of new technologies and the development of new ideas is, at least partially, a 
public good that freely flows across different firms, industries and world regions. Thanks to this 
                                                 
14 A similar behaviour is found for Old Europe (OLDEURO) and Canada, Japan and New Zealand 
(CAJANZ). 
  21flow of ideas, the development of new technologies spreads across firms, industries and world 
regions from an initially very narrow set of innovators. The development of new technologies is 
concentrated in a few world regions, and international spillovers have a potential role to play in 
assuring a wider diffusion of new discoveries. Greater knowledge flows will make it easier and 
less costly to achieve energy efficiency gains. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature on the costs of GHG stabilization by providing a first 
assessment of the potential role of international knowledge flows in fostering the development 
of new energy technologies. Disembodied international energy R&D spillovers are modeled in 
the WITCH model. The amount of spillovers entering each world region depends on a pool of 
freely available knowledge and on the ability of each country to benefit from it, i.e. on its 
absorption capacity. Knowledge acquired from abroad combines with domestic capital stock 
and investments and thus contributes to the production of new technologies at home. 
 
We focused on the stabilization of world CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere at 450ppmv by 
the end of the 21
st century (550 ppmv when considering all gases) and showed that, when 
international knowledge spillovers are explicitly modeled, optimal energy R&D investments are 
lower than previously estimated. In particular, the strongest free-riding effects are recorded 
among High Income countries. The reason lies in the higher exposure of these economies to the 
international exchange of ideas, and thus on greater benefits in terms of potential investment 
savings. However, thanks to spillovers, total knowledge stocks remain unchanged and the main 
gain for each country is a lower expenditure in energy R&D. These savings are not negligible in 
absolute terms, but are only a small share of the overall stabilization bill. The result is that 
stabilization costs are slightly changed by endogenising international energy R&D spillovers. 
 
Sensitivity analysis revealed that these findings are robust to a range of parameter values. High 
income countries are more sensitive to variations of the parameters than Low Income countries, 
especially in the first decades of the century. Given the lack of empirical evidence on the actual 
role of international spillovers in the development of domestic technologies, it is worth 
concentrating the efforts in studying knowledge dynamics in High Income countries. 
 
Despite the above conclusions, this paper has achieved some policy relevant results. 
International spillovers are indeed an important policy channel. This is why we focused our 
analysis on a policy-mix in which a stabilization policy based on a global permit market is 
coupled with a technology policy based on transfers designed to enhance the absorption 
  22capacity in Low Income countries. The new model that we developed enabled us to assess the 
implications of such policy-mix. Our results show that this policy-mix can reduce the costs of 
stabilizing GHG emissions (and is more cost-effective than a stabilization policy alone). More 
specifically, without policies targeted to enhance absorption capacity, the dissemination of 
knowledge does not appear to contribute significantly to the achievement of ambitious 
stabilization targets. Low Income countries have barriers that prevent them from absorbing 
international knowledge spillovers. Hence, exchanges of ideas remains confined to High Income 
countries, were the overwhelming majority of R&D investments takes place. However, even 
with greater absorption capacity, the main effect is a substitution of foreign to domestic efforts, 
as has been found optimal for High Income countries. Therefore, greater knowledge flows and 
higher investments in absorption capacity in Low Income countries must necessarily be 
combined with specific measures aimed at reducing free-riding incentives. 
 
It is worth noting that during the 2007 G8 Summit at Heiligendamm, in Germany, 
complementary-technology-agreement for contrasting climate change and increasing energy 
security have been strongly advocated. The final Summit Declaration explicitly asks for 
"unprecedented international cooperation" in developing new technologies.
16 Our policy 
exercise shows a previously disregarded possible area of policy intervention in the spirit of the 
Heiligendamm Declaration. 
                                                 
16 Heiligendamm Summit Declaration, June 7, 2007, at Para. 43. 
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